Hi! I am a Ph.D. student at the Princeton University Department of Economics interested in labor markets, industrial organization, market design, higher education, and information economics.

In addition to economics, I am passionate about weird music and good food.


Market Design for a Monopsonistic Labor Market (with Wilbur Townsend), 2021.


This paper asks whether centralized matching can make monopsonistic labor markets more efficient. We construct a job-matching model with fungible workers in which each firm must pay all its workers the same salary. This restriction generates monopsonistic inefficiencies: while the core contains efficient allocations, it can contain inefficient allocations as well. Workers prefer an efficient core allocation over any other core allocation. Firms prefer inefficient core allocations in which they pay lower salaries and thus extract greater profits. When production technologies are public information, a strategyproof mechanism can elicit how workers value employment, and thus implement an efficient core allocation. However, no strategyproof mechanism can elicit firms’ production technologies. Thus centralized matching can improve monopsonistic labor markets when the market designer observes production.

Fun Stuff

My favorite DJ set.

My favorite contemporary classical piece.

Many years ago, I made this EP.

One of my favorite poems.

I recently watched this great documentary on Netflix.

My favorite NYC art gallery.

My favorite food podcast.

One of my favorite visual artists.