Jesse Silbert

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Placement Director	Gianluca Violante	violante@princeton.edu	609-258-4003
Graduate Administrator	Laura Hedden	lhedden@princeton.edu	609-258-4006

Education

Princeton University *2019-present*

PhD Candidate in Economics
Expected Completion Date: June 2026

Columbia University *2013-2017*

B.A. in Economics-Mathematics

References

Alessandro Lizzeri
Stanley G. Ivins '34 Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
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Adam Kapor
Associate Professor of Economics and Public Affairs
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Jakub Kastl
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Simon Jäger
Associate Professor of Economics and Public Affairs
Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section
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Princeton University
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Fields

PRIMARY Industrial Organization, Labor Economics

SECONDARY Economics of AI, Market Design

Job Market Paper

"Making Talk Cheap: Generative AI and Labor Market Signaling." *(with Anaïs Galdin.)* 2025.

Large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have significantly lowered the cost of producing written content. This paper studies how LLMs, through lowering writing costs, disrupt markets that traditionally relied on writing as a costly signal of quality (e.g., job applications, college essays). Using data from `Freelancer.com`*, a major digital labor platform, we explore the effects of LLMs' disruption of labor market signaling on equilibrium market outcomes. We develop a novel LLM-based measure to quantify the extent to which an application is tailored to a given job posting. Taking the measure to the data, we find that employers had a high willingness to pay for workers with more customized applications in the period before LLMs were introduced,*

but not after. To isolate and quantify the effect of LLMs' disruption of signaling on equilibrium outcomes, we develop and estimate a structural model of labor market signaling, in which workers invest costly effort to produce noisy signals that predict their ability in equilibrium. We use the estimated model to simulate a counterfactual equilibrium in which LLMs render written applications useless in signaling workers' ability. Without costly signaling, employers are less able to identify high-ability workers, causing the market to become significantly less meritocratic: compared to the pre-LLM equilibrium, workers in the top quintile of the ability distribution are hired 19% less often, workers in the bottom quintile are hired 14% more often.

Working Papers

- "Job Matching without Price Discrimination." *(with Wilbur Townsend.) 2025*

  Revise and Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior

Work in Progress

- "Congestion and Effortful Information Provision in Two-Sided Markets."
  (with Anaïs Galdin.)
- "Attentional Market Power on Digital Labor Platforms."
  (with Anaïs Galdin and Yiying Tan.)

Research Assistance

2018-2019 Pre-Doctoral Research Fellow, Opportunity Insights at Harvard University

2017-2018 Pre-Doctoral Research Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Teaching

Princeton ECO 325: Organization and Design of Markets (TA, Fall 2023)

ECO 310: Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach (TA, Fall 2022)

Grants, Fellowships, and Awards

Princeton University Graduate Fellowship *2019-2025*

National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship *2021-2024*

Department of Economics Graduate Student Teaching Prize, Princeton University *Fall 2023*

William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center
Summer Research Grant, Princeton University *Summer 2023*

Magna Cum Laude with Departmental Honors in Economics,
Columbia University *Spring 2017*

Professional Activities

Referee Service
Journal of Economic Theory

Last updated: October 2025